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THE VOICEPRINT DILEMMA: SHOULD VOICES,
BE SEEN AND NOT HEARD?
An anonymous caller telephoned the Communications Division of the
Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department to report that a policeman was in trouble. This anonymous call was recorded as are all incoming
calls. The Department relayed the message by radio to patrolling units. An
officer answered the call, but found no policeman in trouble and began to
drive away. At a nearby intersection the officer encountered two individuals
whom he recognized immediately; they shouted obscenities at him as they
retreated into a nearby wooded area. When the officer failed to follow them,
the two men emerged from the wooded area and approached the police car.
One produced a gun and fired five shots into the car, one of which struck the
officer in the wrist. The officer managed to shift the car into gear and
drive to safety.
Police subsequently arrested two suspects, the appellants in the instant
case, each of whom was required to recite the statements made in the
recorded call. The police sent tape-recordings of the suspects' voices and
the recording of the anonymous call to the Michigan State Police Department for voiceprint analysis. Lieutenant Nash, a voiceprint expert,1 prepared spectrograms 2 of the three tapes and concluded that one of the appellants had made the anonymous call. The trial court admitted these voiceprint identifications into evidence and the defendants were convicted.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed the decision to admit the voiceprint identifications. 4 The
court applied the test for expert testimony that it had originally promulgated
in Frye v. United States:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must
be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
1. Lieutenant Ernest Nash is the officer in charge of the Voiceprint Identification Unit of the Scientific Crime Laboratory of the Michigan State Police. He has
studied under Lawrence Kersta, the man who pioneered the technique of speaker
identification through voice spectrogram analysis. Nash has also studied Audiology and
Speech Sciences at Michigan State University and has made most of the voice spectrogram identifications used in criminal prosecutions throughout the nation.
2. A voice spectrogram is a graphic representation of an individual's speech as
produced by a machine called a sound spectrograph. Voice spectrograms are commonly referred to as "voiceprints" and the terms are used interchangeably throughout this note.
3. United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd sub nom.
United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
4. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'g United States
v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972). The court upheld the conviction,
however, on the grounds that there was enough evidence to sustain the verdict without
recourse to the voiceprint identification.
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testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs. 5
The court expressly reaffirmed Frye as the "standard for determining
'6
whether a generic class of scientific evidence is to be admitted at trial."
After discussing the literature in the field and the expert testimony received
by the trial court, the court of appeals held voiceprint identifications to be
inadmissible as evidence in criminal trials on the grounds that they "have
not attained the general acceptance of the scientific community to the
degree required in this jurisdiction by Frye. Whatever its promise may
be for the future, voiceprint identification is not now sufficiently accepted
by the scientific community as a whole to form a basis for a jury's deter'7
mination of guilt or innocence."
Several appellate courts have faced the problem of whether to admit
voiceprint identifications into evidence. These courts disagree as to (1)
the proper test to be applied in deciding whether to admit voiceprint evidence, and (2) the proper result to be reached under any given test.8 The
outcome under each test depends in varying degrees upon the state of the
science of voiceprint identification. This note will therefore examine the
theoretical basis and current scientific status of the voiceprint technique
before discussing the technique's legal history and attempting to isolate
the proper test for its admission into evidence and the proper result
thereunder. 9
5. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Numerous jurisdictions have adopted the
Frye standard. See cases collected in Note, Voiceprint Identification, 61 GaO. L.J.
703, 723 n.160 (1973).
6. 498 F.2d at 743.
7. Id. at 745 (footnote omitted).
8. For a discussion of the leading court decisions, see notes 57-131 and accompanying text infra. For a sense of the commentators' differences, see generally Cederbaums, Voiceprint Identification: A Scientific and Legal Dilemma, 5 CRIe. L. BULL.
323 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cederbaums]; Jones, Danger - Voiceprints Ahead,
11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 549 (1973); Kamine, The Voiceprint Technique: Its Structure and Reliability, 6 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 213 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Kamine];
Comment, Mr. Kersta's Magic Box: The Admissibility of Voiceprint Evidence in
Criminal Cases, 10 HousT. L. REv. 85 (1972); Comment, The Evidentiary Value of
Spectrographic Voice Identification, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 343 (1972); Comment,
The Admissibility of Voiceprint Evidence, 14 S. DAK. L. REv. 129 (1969); Comment,
The Status of Voiceprints as Admissible Evidence, 24 SYR. L. REv. 1261 (1973);
Comment, Voiceprints: The End of the Yellow Brick Road, 8 U. SAN FRAN. L. Rav.
702 (1974) ; Comment, The Voiceprint Technique: A Problem in Scientific Evivdence,

18

WAYNE

L. REv. 1365 (1972).

For an excellent analysis of the issues involved in the admission of scientific
evidence, see Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence,
1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1.
9. The admissibility of lay aural identification of an individual is beyond the
scope of this note. Such identifications do not carry the aura of infallibiltiy of
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VOICEPRINTS

THE TECHNIQUE

Speech spectrography began at Bell Laboratories during World War
II. Its originators hoped the technique would have military value; with the
end of the war, the original interest in voiceprinting ended also. In 1962
Lawrence Kersta, an engineer at Bell, rediscovered voiceprints, and introduced the proposition that a given speaker could be identified by his
voiceprint. 10
To understand Kersta's idea, and indeed, to understand the voiceprint
controversy, it is necessary to become acquainted with the rudiments of
the technique. All speech produces sound waves. The spectrograph is a
machine designed to resolve complex sound waves into their component
frequencies. These frequencies and their respective intensities are plotted
across time on electrically sensitive paper. The result is a graph known as
a spectogram or voiceprint. For legal purposes the spectogram generally
used is the bar spectogram in which the component frequencies appear in a
series of vertical lines; intensity appears in the relative darkness of these
lines."
"scientific" identifications and are judged by wholly different standards. Lay aural
identifications are almost universally admitted into eviderice upon a showing that the
individual making the identification is personally familiar with the voice of the alleged
speaker; that is, that he has a basis upon which to make an identification. See Annot.,
1 .
70 A.L.R.2d 995 (1960).
Numerous other personal characteristics may be the subject of lay identifications, and, provided the witness has the requisite degree of personal familiarity with
the characteristic as that of the person sought to be identified, these identifications
are generally admissible. See, e.g., Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 272 (1961); J. WIGMOaRE,
EVIDENCE § 693 (3d ed. 1940) (handwriting identifications'as made by the jury itself
and by lay witnesses). On lay identifications generally, see J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE
§§ 656-60 (3d ed. 1940).
Lay identifications are subject to exclusion where made under prejudicially
suggestive circumstances. This objection occurs most frequently in pre-trial eyewitness identifications, see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) ; Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293' (1967); Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 487 (1971), but lay aural
identifications are equally susceptible to this objection. See Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 1261
(1961); cf. Stovall v. Denno, supra.
: i
I
10. For more on the early history of voiceprinting, see generally R. PoTTER,
G. Kopp & H. Kopp, VISIBLE SPEEcH 4 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as VISIBLE
SPEEcH]; Kamine, supra note 8.
11. VISIBLE SPEECH, supra note 10; Bolt, Cooper, David, Denes, Pickett, &
Stevens, Speaker Identification by Speech Spectrograms:: A Scientists' View of its
Reliability for Legal Purposes, 47 J. AcousT. Soc'Y AM.''597, 604-05 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bolt, Speaker Identification].
A second type of voice spectrogram is the contour spectrogram which
records essentially the same information as the bar spectrogram, but which emphasizes
intensity rather than frequency and results in a graph, resembling a contour map.
For a technical view of how the modern spectrograph operates, see Presti,
High-Speed Sound Spectrograph, 40 J. AcousT; Soc',, AM. 628 (1966).
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Theoretically two spectrograms of the same word produced by the
same speaker will be so similar that an examiner of the two voiceprints
can discern whether the words represented were spoken by the same or
different persons. 12 To make an identification, the examiner prepares
spectrograms of the unknown voice and of each of the known voices. He
then compares the spectrograms visually.13 Thus the identification process
is actually an exercise: in pattern matching.' 4 In a forensic situation the
unknown print generally comes from some incriminating recording - the
recorded phone call in the principal case; the known prints generally come
from voice exemplars taken from suspects, as in the principal case. A
suspect may be positively identified as the speaker in the incriminating recording, -or he may be *positively eliminated. In many cases the examiner
is unable to declare positively either a match or a non-match.' 5 It should
be noted that the spectrograms under comparison must have identical
phonetic content. In experimental situations several monosyllabic cue words
are usually used. 16 In a forensic situation the suspect is generally made
to repeat at least some portion of the incriminating sample. 17 If the exemplars under analysis differ in content words or sounds common to both
are extracted and the voiceprints of these sounds are compared.' 8
12. Kersta, Voiceprint.Identification, 196 NATURE 1253 (1962)

as

[hereinafter cited

NATURE].

Kersta's presentation made identification appear far easier than it has since
proven to be. See notes 24-56 and accompanying text infra.
13. The professional examiner in a criminal investigation generally makes aural
comparisons of the actual voices as well as visual comparisons of the spectrograms.
See note 38 and accompanying text infra.
14. See Kamine, supra note 8, at 216.
15. See United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641, 644 (D.D.C. 1972) and
Tosi, Oyer, Lashbrook, Pedrey, Nicol, & Nash, Experiment on Voice Identification,
51 J. AcousT. Soc'v Am. 2030, 2042 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Tosi, Voice
Identification] for Lieutenant Nash's record of identifications. See also note 154 infra.
16. Kersta, for exampfe, used the, to and, me, on, is, you, I, it, and a. NATURE,
supra note 12, at 1255.
17. The constitutional ramifications of repeating the incriminating words are discussed at note 69 infra.
Since the professional voiceprint examiner generally makes an aural comparison in addition to the visual one it is essential from a scientific point of view
that there be exemplars from more than one suspect and that all suspects repeat the
same words. These safeguards are required to avoid examiner bias caused by having
only one suspect or having one exemplar which repeats incriminating words while
the others are innocuous. See Ladefoged & Vanderslice, The "Voiceprint" Mystique,
7 WORKING PAPERS IN PHoNLTicS 126, 140-41 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Ladefoged, Mystique]. These safeguards may be of legal signfiicance as well. Although
scientific identifications are seldom objected to as suggestive there is no reason in law
why such objections might not be made, as they frequently are with respect to lay
identifications. See note 9.supra..

18.

NATURE,

supra note' 12, at 1253.
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THE THEORY

The concept of speaker identification by voice spectrogram comparison
rests on the theory that (1) every voice is unique, (2) the spectogram
graphically displays this uniqueness, and (3) an examiner can accurately
discern whether two spectrograms match, that is, come from the same
speaker. The proposition that every voice is unique is sometimes referred
to as the theory of invariant speech. 19 The theory's basic premise is that
the characteristics of each individual's speech are uniquely determined by
his vocal cavities and articulators.20 Vocal cavity contours and dimensions
vary between persons much like any other part of the anatomy; the likelihood of two people having identical cavities seems remote. 2 ' As for the
articulators, not only are they subject to anatomical differences, but their
use in forming speech is a complex learned muscular manipulation unlikely
to be identical in any two people. Combining these factors, Kersta concluded that each person's speech must be unique.22 Kersta apparently
assumed, as the forensic use of voiceprints requires, that the uniqueness
of an individual's voice is manifest every time he speaks.
The second premise underlying the voiceprint technique is that the
spectrogram adequately displays this uniqueness. No one questions that
the spectrograph depicts accurately and consistently those parameters of
speech that it has been designed to graph. But the theory goes further
and assumes that those parameters - frequency and intensity plotted across
time - are the ones which truly represent the unique elements of indi23
vidual speech.
The third element of the theory is that an examiner can by visual
comparison accurately and consistently match spectrograms from the same
speaker. In practical terms, this means that a given individual's utterances
of a given sound will always produce spectrograms so similar as to be
susceptible of visual matching, while every other speaker's utterance of
that sound will result in a spectrogram sufficiently distinct from the principal speaker's to enable visual detection of the difference.
19. E.g., Comment, The Evidentiary Value of Spectrographic Voice Identifications, 63 J. CRim. L.C. & P.S. 343 (1972).
20. NATURE, supra note 12, at 1254-55; Bolt, Speaker Identification, supra note
11, at 604. The vocal cavities include the throat, the nasal cavities, and the two oral
cavities formed by the tongue. The articulators include the lips, teeth, tongue, soft
palate and jaw muscles.
21. NATURE, supra note 12, at 1255.
22. Id. at 1254. Kersta claimed that each individual's voiceprints are as unique
as are his fingerprints. Id. at 1253. But see Bolt, Speaker Identification,supra note 11,
at 599-600, 606-08, for a more detailed scientific and historical analysis which concludes that the reliability of voiceprint identification will never match that of fingerprint identification.
23. But see Bolt, Speaker Identification, supra note 11, at 599, 605.
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THE SCIENTIFIC CONTROVERSY

Scientific History

It soon became apparent that voiceprint identification was not as
simple as Kersta had envisioned. 24 Kersta's examiners2 5 had achieved a
99% accuracy rate in "closed" tests, tests in which each unknown voiceprint which the examiners were asked to identify had an actual match in
a library of voiceprints whose speakers were known. The examiner's task
therefore was merely to identify the "best" match. This procedure failed to
account for a feature crucial to the forensic use of the voiceprint technique:
the possibility of no match.2 6 Subsequent experimenters seized upon and
27
remedied this defect, with results that sharply disparaged Kersta's claims.
24. See NATURE, supra note 12.
25. Kersta's examiners were a group of high school girls who trained for one
week. Id. at 1255.
26. Suppose an examiner has voiceprints from several suspects. After comparing them with voiceprints made from the incriminating recording, he must decide not
which is the "best" match, but if there is a match at all, since the possibility exists
that no one in a group of suspects is the guilty speaker. This element of uncertainty that there may be no match - renders the forensic or "open" test far more difficult
than Kersta's closed tests.
27. The first "open" tests were conducted in 1968. Stevens, Williams, Carbonell,
& Woods, Speaker Authentication and Identification: A Comparison of Spectrographic and Auditory Presentation of Speech Material, 44 J. AcousT. Soc'" AM.
1596 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Stevens, et al.].The tests were "open" in that
they explored the possibility of a "no match" result. See note 26 and accompanying
text supra. In open aural tests only 6-8% of the unknown samples were incorrectly
identified with a library match. But in open visual tests, where 87.5% of the unknown
speakers actually had a match, there was a 31% incorrect authentication rate, and
where only 50% of the unknown speakers actually had a match, there was 47%
rate of incorrect authentication.
Early critics of Kersta's work seized on another element of the voiceprint
technique - the effect of context on the identification process. See Young and
Campbell, Effects of Context on Talker Identification, 42 J. AcousT. Soc'Y AM. 1250
(1967). In a contextual trial the examiner compares an utterance extracted from one
sentence with the same utterance extracted from a different sentence or spoken in
isolation. Young's and Campbell's examiners averaged a 21.6% error rate during their
training period, working with samples spoken only in isolation, and averaged a 62.7%
error rate on the identification of sounds extracted from context. These results indicate that it is far easier to identify a speaker where both of the utterances to be
compared were spoken in isolation.
It is also apparently easier to identify a speaker where the utterances to be
compared are longer. See Stevens et al., supra. This result is far more important to
the forensic use of voiceprints than the contextual experiments of Young and Campbell since a suspect may be compelled to repeat the incriminating recording, see note
69 infra, giving the forensic examiner longer, more similar utterances with which to
work, arguably enabling his accuracy to exceed experimental accuracy.
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Despite the inconclusive state of experimentation, and despite two
state appellate rejections, 28 several courts admitted voiceprint identifica29
This prompted
tions into evidence, chiefly on the testimony of Kersta.
the Acoustical
of
the Technical Committee on Speech Communication
to investigate
members
Society of America to appoint a panel of six Society
3l
30
yet unknown
was
Their report pointed out how much
the technique.
critical
highly
was
and
about speech generally and voiceprints 32in particular
procedure.
the
on
of premature reliance
Shortly thereafter, Doctor Oscar Tosi released the results of his experiments.3 3 Tosi first conducted closed tests in which he duplicated
Kersta's 99% accuracy. 34 Forensically more important, however, he then
conducted "open" tests 35 which resulted in approximately 6% false identifications; this error rate included finding matches where none existed, and
finding incorrect matches where a correct one existed. Tosi also reported
approximately 137 false eliminations; that is, a library match existed for
36
an unknown sample, but was not discovered.
Extrapolating from his results to the forensic situation, Tosi ventured
that his 6% false identification rate represented the maximum error rate
likely in forensic use of voiceprint identification.3 7 He based this view
28. State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967); People v. King, 266 Cal.
App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968). These cases are discussed infra at notes
67-76 and accompanying text.
29. United States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967); People
v. Straehle, No. 9323/64 (Westchester City Ct. 1966), N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1966,
§ 1, at 1, col. 2, indictment subsequently dismissed, 53 Misc. 2d 512, 279 N.Y.S.2d 115
(Westchester County Ct. 1967).
30. Richard H. Bolt (Bolt Beranek and Newman, Inc.), Franklin S. Cooper
(Haskins Laboratories), Edward E. David, Jr. (Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc.),
Peter B. Denes (Bell Telephone Laboratories), James M. Pickett (Galludet College),
and Kenneth N. Stevens (Research Laboratory of Electronics, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology) [hereinafter cited as Bolt et al.].
31. Bolt, Speaker Identification, supra note 11.
32. Id. at 603 passim.
33. Tosi is Professor of Audiology and Speech Sciences and Physics at Michigan
State University. He holds two Ph.D's, one in Audiology and Speech Sciences from
Ohio State University, the other in Engineering and Physics from Buenos Aires
University. He is a member of various societies in speech, logopedics, and phoniatrics
including the Acoustical Society of America and has published several books and
numerous papers. He performed a major study of the voiceprint technique from 1968
to 1970 under a $300,000 grant from the Department of Justice. The results of this
study have been highly influential in the admission into evidence of voiceprint identifications. See notes 80-106, 121-31 and accompanying text infra. Tosi's work and views
are published in Tosi, Voice Identification,supra note 15.
34. Id. at 2041. Tosi's examiners had a one month training period. They were
forced to make a decision within fifteen minutes in all cases; each answer was accompanied by a confidence rating.
35. See notes 26-27 supra.
36. Tosi, Voice Identification,supra note 15, at 2041.
37. Id. at 2041-42; Tosi appears to have been unconcerned about the forensic
ramifications of false eliminations. There is a certain appeal to this view as false
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on the superiority of an expert examiner over the rapidly trained "amateurs" used in his experiments. The expert would have extensive training
and a professional standard of accuracy to maintain. He would make his
decisions based on the best possible samples 38 and would be able to make
aural as well as visual comparisons. His decisions would not be hmnpered
by the strict time limits placed on the experimental examiners. 39 Perhaps
the most important distinction is that the professional examiner would be
able to reach results other than positive identification and positive elimination. He could reach a result of possible identification, possible elimination
or no decision.
Tosi asked his examiners to indicate their confidence in the correctness
of their decision.40 He found a lower error rate in those decisions in which
the examiners expressed great confidence. From this datum, he inferred
that if decisions were reached only when the examiner was positive Lhe
false identification rate would be only 2% and the false elimination rate
would be only 5 % for his "amateur" examiners. The professional examiner,
41
he suggested, would achieve an even lower error rate.
Tosi's work was well received in terms of his scientific achievement.
42
His extrapolations were contested, however, both by experts in court
and by the Acoustical Society's investigative committee. 43 In particular,
they saw his 6% false identification rate as the minimum error rate for the
forensic situation. 44 Several reasons were assigned for this conclusion:
(1) Tosi's results in matching non-contemporary spectrograms (made one
month apart in Tosi's experiments) were significantly poorer than his
results in matching contemporary spectrograms ;45 this defect could be
eliminations represent only the potential for acquittal of the guilty. While such
acquittals are not desirable they are clearly less abhorrent to our criminal justice system than convictions of the innocent, a possibility which false identifications represent
Tosi's emphasis on the latter is therefore understandable. The potential acquittal of
the guilty is still serious, however, and worthy of consideration when appraising the
usefulness of the voiceprint technique. See notes 61-63 and accompanying text infra.
38. Tosi, Voice Identification, supra note 15, at 2041-42; Black, Lashbrook,
Nash, Oyer, Pedrey, Tosi & Truby, Reply to "Speaker Identification by Speech Spectrograms: Some Further Observations," 54 J. AcousT. Soc'y Am. 535 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Tosi, Reply]. Basically the professional examiner will have longer,
more identical utterances. See note 27 supra and note 69 infra.
39. Tosi cited the fifteen minute limitation he imposed on his experimental trials
as a key source of error. Id. at 536; Tosi, Voice Identification, supra note 15, at 2042.
40. Tosi required that his examiners rate their confidence level, as either: (1)
almost uncertain, (2) fairly uncertain, (3) fairly certain, or (4) almost certain.
Tosi, Voice Identification, supra note 15, at 2036.
41. Id. at 2041.
42. See notes 107-20 and accompanying text infra.
43. Bolt, Cooper, David, Denes, Pickett & Stevens, Speaker Identification by
Speech Spectrograns: Some Further Observations, 54 J. AcousT. Soc'y Am. 531
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Bolt, Further Observations].
44. Id. Compare Tosi's view at text accompanying note 37 supra.
45, Id. at 532.
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highly significant in the forensic situation which may involve samples made
years apart ;46 (2) experiments on the effects of context on voiceprint identification showed significantly higher error rates than Tosi's ;47 (3) Tosi's
results showed increased error rates when the sample library was enlarged, a result which indicates a greater potential for error when the
4
number of suspects is increased.

Tosi responded to these criticisms by re-asserting his original extrapolations.49 Notably, however, he failed to respond to the problem of the
decline in accuracy when matching non-contemporary spectrograms.50 He
also failed to respond to several long-standing criticisms crucial to the
forensic application of the voiceprint technique, criticisms which Bolt et al.
had raised in their original report'' and which they raised anew in their
response to Tosi's work. 52 These include the effects on voice spectrograms
of voice mimicry, voice disguise, physiological change, and speaker sex. 5'
Although Kersta has made several categorical assertions, based on unpublished experiments, that these factors have no effect, 54 documented
experimentation indicates that some of them - especially the passage of
46. E.g., State v. Andretta, 61 N.J. 544, 296 A.2d 644 (1972) (four years between
incriminating recording and suspect exemplar). See discussion at notes 95-96 and
accompanying text infra.
47. Apparently Bolt et al., supra note 30, erroneously believed that the typical
forensic use would involve extraction from context which Young and Campbell, supra
note 27, had shown decreased accuracy significantly. While the criticism is valid
insofar as it points out a genuine failing of voiceprints, recent constitutional decisions
indicate that forensic uses will involve identical contexts. See note 69 infra.
48. Bolt, Further Observations, supra note 43, at 533.
49. Tosi, Reply, supra note 38. In particular, Tosi emphasized the professional
examiner with his five options, unlimited time, and use of aural comparisons. He
attributed his increased error rate when an expanded library - 40 samples - was
used to the fifteen minute time limit he imposed regardless of library size. Unlimited
time, he argued, would reduce error rates. He noted that the experimental trend
showed that more trained examiners with better samples - longer utterances identical
to the incriminating evidence - produced better results. He also criticized the critics
of voiceprinting as being merely a survey group who had done no experimentation
of their own.
50. See notes 45 and 46 and accompanying text supra.
51. Bolt, Speaker Identification, supra note 11.
52. Bolt, FurtherObservations, supranote 43.
53. See generally Ladefoged, An Opinion on "Voiceprints," 19 WORKING PAPERS
IN PHONETICS 84 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Ladefoged, Opinion]. In particular,
see People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1974), discussed at notes
116-20 and accompanying text infra (voiceprint evidence rejected where the voice
to be identified was allegedly disguised); State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn.
442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971), discussed at notes 84-90 and accompanying text infra
(voiceprint identification of a woman's voice admitted despite Ladefoged's objection
as to the lack of experimentation with female voices).
54. NATURE, supra note 12; Kersta, Speaker Recognition and Identification by
Voiceprints, 40 CONN. B.J. 586 (1966). See also Cederbaums, supra note 8, at 329.
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time - do affect voice spectrograms.5 5 Whether they thereby affect the
professional examiner's identifications remains to be seen.
It would be incorrect to assert that there is at present any consensus
among the relevant experts as to the reliability of the voiceprint technique.
One the one hand are its advocates, consisting almost solely of Tosi, Nash,
and Kersta; on the other side are its critics, who, while accepting Tosi's
scientific results continue to doubt his extrapolations and to publish and
56
testify against reliance on the technique.
Forensic Ramifications of the Scientific Dispute
Tosi's success suggests by inference the basic validity of the voiceprint
theory: that each voice is unique, that voiceprints reflect this fact, and
that trained examiners can detect it. But the error rate in his experiments
indicates at least some flaw in that theory,5 7 a flaw which has yet to be
experimentally isolated. Isolation of that flaw may be crucial to the forensic
use of voiceprint evidence.
First, to the extent that the anatomical and learned manipulative
factors involved in speech production differ from person to person, their
speech is different.5 s But it remains to be proved that the probability of
identical recurrence of these factors in two individuals is statistically so
remote as to render each voice unique. Since a voiceprint theoretically represents the vocal anatomy of the speaker, if identical vocal anatomy is
recurrent with any appreciable frequency, the possibility exists that any
given voiceprint points to more than one speaker, and therefore identifies
none.59 Without proof of voice uniqueness voiceprint identification may be
non-probative since identification evidence depends for its probative value
on the extent to which it points to only one object. 60 This could be the
55. Endres, Bambach, Flosser, Voice Spectrograms as a Function of Age, Voice
Disguise, and Voice Imitation, 49 J. AcousT. Soc'y Am. 1842 (1971).
56. Compare the view of Bolt et al. before Tosi's work - "We conclude that
the available results are inadequate to establish the reliability of voice identifications
by spectrograms," Bolt, Speaker Identification, supra note 11, at 603 -

with their

response after Tosi's work - "present methods . . . lack an adequate scientific basis
for estimating reliability in many practical situations," Bolt, Further Observationis,
supra note 43, at 534. The former work was highly critical of reliance on unproven
theory. The latter work commended Tosi as far as he had gone, but reiterated the
former position that much remains to be proved before reliance on voiceprint identifications is scientifically justifiable. In particular the authors reasserted that the knowledge of voice characteristics is still rudimentary. Id. at 533.
57. Compare Kersta's view in NATURE, supra note 12, which implied that voiceprint identification was wholly accurate.
58. See Bolt, Speaker Identification, supra note 11, at 599, 604.

59. Comparison is often made between voiceprints and fingerprints. The probability of fingerprint recurrence has been estimated at 3 x 1042. Id. at 608. Furthermore the fingerprint pattern is known to remain constant. The voiceprint pattern
has numerous potential variations. Id. at 607 Table B-II.
60. J. WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 411 (3d ed. 1940).
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source of Tosi's false identification rate, which may not have been "false"
at all. Those matches assigned as false may actually have been correct, for
until it is proven that each voice is unique the possibility exists of more
than one correct match. In courtroom use this could result in the identification of an innocent suspect as the speaker in an incriminating recording.
This possibility sharply militates against forensic use of the technique.
It also has not been proven that this uniqueness, if it exists, manifests
itself with such consistency that a given individual's utterance of a given
sound always produces the same voiceprint. The advocates of voiceprint
identification concede that "no person utters the same word twice with all
characteristics being exactly the same." 61 This phenomenon, termed intraspeaker variability,6" 2 presents the problem of how closely a given speaker's
voiceprints will resemble each other. Tosi's work demonstrates that
matches are generally discernible despite intraspeaker variations; but that
they are not consistently so. Recall that Tosi reported a 13% rate of
instances in which a match existed, but the examiner failed to detect it
(false eliminations). 63 In a courtroom this failing, quite probably the
product of intraspeaker variability, could result in a similar rate of acquittal
of the guilty.
The relationship between interspeaker and intraspeaker variability
further complicates the problem. Because of intraspeaker variability the
examiner realizes that voiceprints from the same speaker will ndt be identical and allows for some variation when making an identification. If interspeaker variability is frequently slight (as some data suggests) 64 the variati-on between two different speakers' voiceprints may fall within the allowance made by the examiner for intraspeaker variations and a false identification may be made.
Isolation of the source of Tosi's errors is crucial because if any of the
possible flaws so far discussed are the cause, the situation may be uncorrectable. Nothing science can do is likely to make voices unique if they
are not. Tosi's work may therefore represent the peak of voiceprinting
accuracy. If so, his work is the basis on which decisions as to forensic
use must be made.
The second and third premises of Tosi's theory - that spectrograms
depict the crucial factors for voice uniqueness and that an expert examiner
can visually identify these factors - are likewise subject to theoretical
doubts. Defects in these elements of the theory, unlike flaws in the first
premise, might very well be correctable. Engineering changes in the machine
61. Tosi, Voice Identification,supra note 15, at 2030.
62. Id. at 2030; Bolt, Speaker Identification,supra note 11, at 599.
63. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
64. In fact, one of the original theories of voiceprinting was that the same
utterance always produced the same voiceprint regardless of the speaker. Voiceprints
were viewed as a visual method of determining what was spoken, and not by whom
it was spoken. The assumption behind this theory is that interspeaker variability is
negligible. See VISIBLE SPEECH, supra note 10.
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or new methods of interpretation might be devised which would
the technique to accurately represent such uniqueness as actually
among human voices. It can be seen, therefore, that isolation of the
of error is crucial since some kinds of flaws are correctable while
go to the very heart of the notion that speakers can be mechanically
fied by their voices.

enable
exists
source
others
identi-

THE LEGAL HISTORY

The Courts Before Tosi
The first police use of the voiceprint technique is reported to have
cleared a suspect, 65 and in their first courtroom appearance, voiceprints
were admitted into evidence. 66 More reasoned appellate decision soon followed and courts greeted the technique with less enthusiasm. The New
Jersey Supreme Court handed down the first appellate decision in State v.
Cary,6 7 an interlocutory appeal which raised the issue of compelling a
defendant to give a voice exemplar for purposes of making a voice spectrogram. The court ruled that taking an exemplar was a search within the
scope of the fourth amendment and in order to be permissible the evidence
sought to be obtained must have the "capacity to produce admissible evidence." 68 The case was remanded "so that the trial court may determine
whether the voiceprint technique and equipment are sufficiently accurate to
69
produce results admissible as evidence."
65. Kersta, Speaker Recognition and Identification by Voiceprints, 40 CoxN.
B.J. 586, 593 (1966).
66. People v. Straehle, No. 9323/64 (Westchester City Ct., 1966), N.Y. Times,
Apr. 12, 1966, § 1, at 1, col. 2, noted in 12 N.Y.L.F. 501 (1966).
67. 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967).
68. Id. at 352, 230 A.2d at 388.
69. Id. at 352, 230 A.2d at 389. The court felt that voice exemplars were nontestimonial evidence and would not violate the fifth amendment if compelled.
The potential constitutional problems involved in compelling voice exemplars
for the purpose of making voiceprints never posed any real difficulty for the courts
even before they were laid to rest in their incipiency by the Supreme Court. For
example, in United States v. Askins, 351 F. Supp. 408 (D. Md. 1972), the primary
issue before the court concerned constitutional objections to the compulsion of exemplars for voiceprint purposes. The court relied on Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966), for the proposition that the fifth amendment's proscription against
compulsory self-incrimination applies only to testimonial evidence, on United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), for the proposition that spoken words may be compelled for identification purposes, and on Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967),
for the proposition that handwriting exemplars are non-testimonial and may be compelled. The court concluded that voice exemplars were also non-testimonial and therefore might be compelled without violating the fifth amendment.
The court felt that compelling an exemplar is a search within the meaning of
the fourth amendment, but is permissible as long as probable cause exists. No search
techniques which shock the conscience (proscribed by the fourth amendment, Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)), are involved in the compulsion of a voice exemplar.
As long as there were no wholesale intrusions into the security of the citizenry within
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On remand,70 Kersta testified in favor of the technique while Tosi,
who had not yet performed his experiments, testified that there had been
insufficient experimentation on which to base a scientific opinion. The
defense introduced Doctors Gerstman and Ladefoged 7' who testified that
the technique did not yet have a sufficient scientific basis and was not yet
reliable or generally accepted among scientists. Ladefoged introduced the
letters of thirty-nine colleagues in support of his testimony. Applying a
standard similar to Frye,72 the court stated that a procedure must have
" 'general scientific acceptance as a reliable means of ascertaining the
truth' 73 and held that the voiceprint technique was not yet generally
accepted or reliable enough to be admitted into evidence.
A California court reached a similar result in People v. King.74 Kersta
again testified for the prosecution effort to admit voiceprints, while
the meaning of Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), the court saw no tenable
constitutional objection to the compulsion of a voice exemplar.
In United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), the Supreme Court agreed
on virtually the same analysis that the compulsion of voice exemplars violates neither
the fifth nor the fourth amendments. The voice exemplar was held to be physical, not
testimonial, evidence, outside the scope of the fifth amendment protection. The Court
also construed Davis, supra, as requiring only that the initial seizure of the individual
be lawful; if so, no preliminary showing of reasonableness is required for the compulsion of an exemplar. 410 U.S. at 15.
In addition to dispensing with these constitutional objections the Court clarified Wade, supra, in a manner potentially critical for the forensic application of voiceprints. The Court construed Wade as saying, inter alia, that there is "no error in
compelling a defendant accused of bank robbery to utter in a lineup words that had
allegedly been spoken by the robber." 410 U.S. at 7. A suspect may thus be compelled
to speak the identical words of the criminal where they are known. Accord, United
States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (1975). Since those words are always known in a
voiceprint case, the reliability of the technique may be vastly improved, as scientists
believe that longer, more identical utterances increase the accuracy of voiceprint
identification. See note 27 supra.
Gilbert v. California, supra, held that the taking of handwriting exemplars is
not a critical stage of the criminal process requiring counsel. The taking of voice
exemplars does not seem to vary materially from the taking of handwriting exemplars;
for example, the procedure does not seem conducive to prejudicial suggestiveness
creating a critical stage requiring counsel. See United States v. Wade, supra. Thus
no substantial sixth amendment objections to the taking of an exemplar without counsel seem likely.
70. State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16,
264 A.2d 209 (1970). The Superior Court opinion is noted in 20 Sxm. L. REV.
117 (1968).
71. Doctor Louis J. Gerstman, Associate Professor of Psychology and Speech,
Queens College; Doctor Peter Ladefoged, Professor of Phonetics, University of
California at Los Angeles, co-author of Ladefoged, Mystique, supra note 17. For
a discussion of the testimony in this case see Cederbaums, supra note 8, at 327-36.
72. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (1923), discussed at notes 5-7 and accompanying text supra.
73. State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 332, 239 A.2d 680, 684.
74. 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968).
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Gerstman, Ladefoged, and Doctors Clarke, Joos, and Framki 75 testified for
the defense. The court applied the Frye standard and held that the technique
was not yet generally accepted. The bulk of the court's opinion concerned
Kersta's qualifications as an expert. The court held that he could testify
only as to the machine's operation. His engineering training did not
qualify him to testify on the reliability of the theory since he had no expertise
76
in linguistics, phonetics, physiology or anatomy.

Between the interlocutory appeal and the decision on remand in Cary
7T
came the first appellate acceptance of voiceprints, United States v. Wright.
On the strength of Kersta's testimony that voices were unique and the
technique accepted as reliable, the Court of Military Appeals approved the
admission of voiceprint evidence at trial, despite the opposing testimony
of Doctor Clarke. The court justified this result by applying - over a
vigorous dissent favoring Frye - a different test for the admission of
scientific evidence; this test would admit all relevant expert testimony and
let the trier of fact determine the reliability of the technique and the weight
to be given the results of its application. The court explained that "[c] ourts
have consistently recognized the admissibility of the testimony of experts
in areas where there is neither infallibility of result nor unanimity of
opinion as to the existence vel non of a particular condition or fact, ' 78 and
cited psychiatric testimony and handwriting comparison as examples of
areas where experts disagree and yet their testimony is admissible. 79
75. Doctor Frank Clarke, Ph.D in Sensory and Physiological Psychology, then
engaged in speaker identification research at Stanford University; Doctor Joos, Ph.D
in Philology, University of Wisconsin; Doctor Victoria Fromkin, Ph.D in Linguistics, University of California at Los Angeles, specializing in experimental phonetics. The court also cited a book co-authored by Doctor Peter Denes, member of
Bell Acoustics and Speech Research Laboratory and co-author of Bolt, Speaker
Identification, supra note 11, and Bolt, Further Observations, supra note 43.
76. People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d at 456-59, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 490-92.
77. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967).
78. Id. at 189, 37 C.M.R. at 453.
79. While the examples do illustrate the rule as quoted, both rule and examples
are inapposite. In these areas, experts may disagree as to the application of a technique, or as to the results of that application, but they do not generally question that
the technique is capable of producing the results claimed. For instance, it is common
knowledge that psychiatric diagnoses are often at odds with each other, and it is easy
to picture experts disputing whether two writing samples came from the same hand.
It is much more difficult to imagine experts disputing whether psychiatric diagnoses
or handwriting identifications are possible with any significant degree of reliability.
Yet that is precisely the nature of the voiceprint dispute; experts question the capability of the process itself, not just the results of its application. Herein lies the
importance of the Frye test. That test requires expert testimony at two levels. The
first level requires as a prerequisite to admissibility that scientists in the relevant
fields accept the technique. Whether they do or not is for the determination of the
court. If the court finds they do then the second level of Frye applies: experts may
testify - and disagree - concerning the propriety and results of the instant application of the technique. The Wright rule is the functional equivalent of the latter level
of Frye and should not be substituted for Frye; it is properly the second step of a
two-pronged inquiry. See notes 133-154 and accompanying text infra.
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The Courts After Tdsi
After Tosi published the results of his experiments there was a marked
change in the judicial attitude toward voiceprints. Tosi dropped the
reservations he had expressed in Cary and became the flagbearer for the
voiceprint cause; his work and testimony were virtually conclusive for
many courts. 80 Ladefoged, earlier one of the most vehement critics, modified his position substantially on the basis of Tosi's work8 l and a number
of courts found this change influential.8 2 The other critics seemed stunned
only temporarily as it turned out - and retreated to reassess their
position. In the critics' absence Tosi and Nash faced little challenge to
their testimony in favor of admitting voiceprints. By late 1972 they had
persuaded at least twenty-five courts in approximately twenty jurisdictions
to admit voiceprint identifications into evidence; sa these decisions were
affirmed in the few cases in which the issue was appealed.
Typical of this state of affairs was the decision of the Minnesota
Supreme Court in State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman.8 4 Tosi and Nash
testified in favor of the technique,85 no one testified against it, and Ladefoged
testified as to his new position - that he (and the scientific community in
general) agreed with the work of Tosi as far as it went.86 The court noted
the pre-Tosi position of Bolt et al., considered the changes wrought by Tosi
as well as the expert testimony in the record and held that voiceprint identifications were admissible in a proper case: (1) to establish probable
80. E.g., United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1971); Hodo v.
Superior Court, Riverside County, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973). See Tosi & Nash, Voiceprint Identification: Rules for Evidence, TRIAL 44, 48 n.1 (Jan./Feb. 1973).
81. You are correct in thinking that I have been much concerned over the use
of spectrograms in legal proceedings. I used to be very much opposed to their
use; but in the past year various events have made me cautiously reconsider
this possibility.
The first event was the publication of Oscar Tosi's report. I have read this
very carefully, and consider it to be an excellent piece of work, well designed
and carried out with true scientific objectivity.
Ladefoged, Opinion, supra note 53, at 84. See also Ladefoged, Mystique, supra note 17.
82. United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972); State ex rel.
Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971); State v. Andretta, 61
N.J. 544, 296 A.2d 644 (1972).
83. Tosi & Nash, Voiceprint Identification: Rules for Evidence, TRIAL 44, 48 n.1
(Jan./Feb. 1973). See also United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 n.10 (1975);
People v. Chapter, 13 CRIm. L. REp. 2479 (Manin County, Cal. Super. Ct. July
23, 1973).
84. 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971), noted in 38 Mo. L. Rav. 326 (1973).
85. Tosi termed the technique "extremely reliable" and Nash testified that his
identification here was "beyond any doubt." Id. at 454-55, 192 N.W.2d at 439.
86. Id. at 456, 192 N.W.2d at 440. See note 80 supra. The defendant here was
a woman and Ladefoged pointed out that women's voices were largely untested,
therefore the ability to identify them was really unknown. Tosi disagreed.
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cause for arrest and search warrants, (2) to corroborate aural identificas7
tions, and (3) to impeach a party.
The court applied instead of Frye the same expert testimony test the
Wright court had used.8 8 However, it is likely that the court on the record
before it would have reached the same result even if it had applied Frye.8 9
The record indicated that "the thing from which the deduction [was]
made [was] sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs," 0 0
On a very similar record the trial court in the principal case, United
States v. Raymond,91 relied on and then went beyond Trimble, holding
voiceprints admissible not merely to corroborate, but also to prove, identity.
The trial court noted that Tosi's work had corrected the flaws in Kersta's
and concluded on the basis of Tosi's work that voiceprint identification
was "reliable enough" to be admitted into evidence. 92 Although Frye was
decided by the court of appeals in the same jurisdiction, it was not mentioned in Raymond. Instead the court applied its own "reliable enough"
standard as the test for admission, and held that the technique met this
standard. This test seems to require a preliminary ruling by the court that
a technique is "reliable enough" to justify its admission into evidence.
Expert testimony on the application of the technique to the facts is then
submitted to the fact finder. The Raymond court failed to state whether
its finding that the technique was "reliable enough" was based on accept87. While the holding of the case concerned only the first of these three uses,
there is a strong dictum indicating that this court would admit voiceprints for the
other two purposes as well. 291 Minn. at 458, 192 N.W.2d at 441.
88. It is common knowledge that the opinion of an expert on an identification
subject is seldom so infallible that others in his field do not disagree with him.
But disagreement alone does not make the opinion inadmissible. Where experts
disagree, it is for the factfinder, whether that be the jury or court, to determine
which is more credible and therefore more acceptable. In the field of medicine,
it is not unusual to have doctors disagree as to the cause or effect of an illness
or accident.
Id. at 456, 192 N.W.2d at 440.
But it would be unusual to have doctors disagree as to whether doctors are
capable of determining the cause or effect of an illness or accident. This is the problem
which Frye addresses. There is no merit in admitting a medical opinion unless doctors
at least believe that opinion is possible. See note 79 supra.
89. Compare the record before this court (see notes 84-86 and accompanying
text supra) with the record before the court in King (see notes 74-76 and accompanying text supra).
90. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923).
91. 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd sub norn. United States v. Addison,
498 F2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974), noted in 18 N.Y.L.F. 779 (1973). Tosi, Nash and
Ladefoged testified to the same effect as they had in State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman,
291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971). See notes 84-86 and accompanying text supra.
Ladefoged testified that the technique was accepted to the extent of Tosi's experiments,
but what seemed more influential to the court was his "conversion" since the publication
of Ladefoged, Mystique, supra note 17. See also note 81 supra.
92. 337 F. Supp. at 645.
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ance in the scientific community or the court's own estimate of reliability.
The language of the opinion suggests the latter.
Shortly after Raymond, the New Jersey Supreme Court had an
opportunity to reconsider Cary9 3 and an intermediate appellate court in
95
California had an opportunity to reconsider King.94 In State v. Andretta,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that recent scientific and judicial
acceptance 9" of the voiceprint technique made the compelled taking of voice
exemplars "reasonable" for the purposes of the fourth amendment. The
court indicated that a pre-trial hearing on admissibility would be required
if the prosecution chose to introduce the voiceprints into evidence. In so
doing, this court, like the Raymond court, recognized the need for a preliminary inquiry as to admissibility before the jury is permitted to hear
testimony as to the identification. But the court did not say what standard
general scientific acceptance or some other - governed admissibility.
In Hodo v. Superior Court, Riverside County,97 the Fourth District
Court of Appeals of California reached the same result as the Raymond
court, relying heavily on Tosi's correction of Kersta's flaws. Unlike the
Raymond court, however, the Hodo court applied the Frye test9 3 and
found that "since King voiceprint identification has received general acceptance by recognized experts in the field who would be expected to be
familiar with its use and has therefore reached the standard of scientific
acceptance and reliability necessary for its admissibility into evidence." 99
The court's decision as to the satisfaction of Frye was correct on the
record before it. As was becoming the pattern, however, only proponents
Nash and Tosi - testified. Tosi recounted his scientific achievements
93. State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967), on remand, 99 N.J. Super.
323, 239 A.2d 680 (1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970), discussed at notes
67-73 and accompanying text supra.
94. People v. King, 206 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968).
95. 61 N.J. 544, 296 A.2d 644 (1972).
96. The court relied principally on Tosi's work and testimony since Cary. The
fact that his position had changed was also influential: he had refused to testify that
voiceprints were reliable in Cary. See text accompanying note 70 supra. Ladefoged's
change of position was equally influential. As in Trimble and Raymond, he testified
to general scientific acceptance to the extent of Tosi's work. The court was also
highly influenced by the Raymond and Trimble opinions themselves.
The court's position in Andretta is particularly notable in that the case involved a recording made four years earlier. One of Tosi's greatest failings had been
in the area of such "non-contemporary" spectrograms. His error rate had increased
appreciably - in fact it had doubled - when his examiners compared spectrograms
made from voices spoken only one month apart and no really long time span tests
had ever been attempted. The court here did not, however, have the benefit of the
reply of Bolt et al., supra note 43, to Tosi's work, which pointed out this failing.
See notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra
97. 30 Cal. App. 3d 780, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973).
98. More precisely, the court applied Frye's California progeny, Huntingdon v.
Crowley, 64 Cal. 2d 647, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254, 414 P.2d 382 (1966), and People v.
Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958).
99. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 790-91, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
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and testified that voiceprint identification was both reliable and generally
accepted by those who would be expected to be familiar with its use. He
also submitted a list of colleagues who purportedly shared his views, including Doctors Ladefoged and Gerstman. 100 On this record the court
could not help but find that Frye had been met; unfortunately the record
did not reflect the true state of opinion in the scientific community. 01'
Two intermediate appellate courts in Florida also handed down
decisions following the post-Tosi judicial trend toward admitting voiceprint
evidence. The court in Worley v. State'0 2 faced the question of whether
to admit voiceprint identifications for the limited purpose of corroborating
other identifications. The court applied a preliminary test for admissibility
before permitting testimony as to the instant identification. As in Raymond,
the standard applied was reliability: whether "certain standards of scientific reliability have been attained.' u03 The court found, chiefly on the
basis of Tosi-Nash testimony, that trained examiners were capable of 98%
accuracy and that the requisite scientific reliability existed; it therefore
10 4
admitted the voiceprint evidence for the limited purpose before the court.
In Alea v. State'0 5 the court used the expert testimony approach; as in
Trimble and Wright, the court permitted the jury to hear all the expert
testimony given, thus allowing the trier to make its own determination on
the reliability of the technique in deciding what weight to give the
identification. 106
Critics Regrouped and Criticism Renewed
In mid-1973 a decision in the Superior Court of Marin County California, People v. Chapter,107 began a reversal of the trend toward admitting
voiceprint identifications into evidence. The court confronted the issue of
whether voiceprints met the Frye test and held they did not. The court
pointed out that most of the "admitting" jurisdictions had heard only
proponents of the technique, 0 8 giving them the unfair impression of general
100. Id. at 788, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 553. Both of these individuals had testified in
King as to the unreliability of Kersta's tests.
101. See notes 24-56 and accompanying text supra.
102. 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
103. Id. at 614. This "scientific reliability" test is not the same as the Frye
"scientific acceptance" test. See notes 133-43 and accomapnying text infra. But see
note 124 and accompanying text infra.
104. Id.
105. 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
106. Id. at 98.
107. 13 CRIM. L. REP. 2479 (Matin County, Cal. Super. Ct. July 23, 1973), noted *n
Comment, Voiceprints: The End of the Yellow Brick Road, 8 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV.
702 (1974). But see United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(voiceprints admitted at parole revocation hearing) and notes 121-31 and accompanying text infra.
108. 13 CRIM. L. REP. at 2479. Generally Nash or Nash and Tosi were the only
experts in these other cases.
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acceptance where none existed. The Chapter court, however, had the
advantage of counter-testimony, including, significantly, that of Doctor
Ladefoged, whose peers had begun to give him second thoughts about
testifying as to their acceptance of the technique. 0 9
The court in the principal case, United States v. Addison 10 - the
same court that promulgated Frye - reached the same result as the
Chapter court. In reversing the district court, the court of appeals pointed
out that the Frye test requiring general scientific acceptance was still the
proper test, and that it had not been met on the record before the court.
That record consists of three expert witnesses upon whose testimony
the trial court had based its conclusion that the voiceprint technique was
"reliable enough." One of these witnesses was Tosi; the second was Ladefoged, whose testimony the district court had interpreted as favorable but
which the court of appeals re-interpreted as an " 'abatement of skepticism;'"" the third was Doctor Donald Graham Stuart, Professor of
Language and Linguistics at Georgetown University, 112 who "expressed
his opinion that it was 'dangerous and irresponsible' to purport to make
absolute identification by comparison of spectrograms. Dr. Stuart also
represented that the scientific community continued to view the technique
with skepticism and concern, even after the release of the Tosi study." 113
The court of appeals cited on its own the response to Tosi of Bolt et al.,114
published some time after the trial court decision. The critique commended
Tosi for his work as far as it went, but expressed reservations about
his extrapolations. 115
In People v. Law,116 a California district court of appeals declined to
follow Hodo, choosing instead to follow Addison. The court in Law faced
for the first time in a voiceprint case the problem of identifying an allegedly
disguised voice. 117 After noting the testimony of Tosi, Nash and Ladefoged
109. See Comment, Voiceprints: The End of the Yellow Brick Road, 8 U. SAN
L. REv. 702, 726 n.145 (1974). Note 145 of that work also lists some of the
other contemporary critics of voiceprint. See also Jones, Danger - Voiceprints Ahead,
11 AM. CRIm. L. REv. 549 (1973). Several of Ladefoged's colleagues have indicated
to him that his testimony (apparently in Raymond) concerning their general acceptance of the voiceprint technique was mistaken. Id. at 571.
110. 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'g United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp.
641 (D.D.C. 1972).
111. Id. at 745, quoting Ladefoged himself.
112. Doctor Stuart was also Director of the Phonetics Laboratory at Georgetown University. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 745 n.10 citing Bolt, Further Observations, supra note 43.
115. See text at notes 37-48 supra. Bolt et al., supra note 30, also "question[ed]
the basis on which claims have been made that the dominant view of the scientific
community is now in agreement" with Tosi's extrapolations. Id. at 533.
116. 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1974).
117. The case involved a telephoned bomb threat which had been recorded. The
defendant's estranged wife testified that the recorded voice sounded like her husband's
voice disguised.
FRAN.
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and after citing the reply to Tosi of Bolt et al., the court held that voiceprint
evidence failed to meet the Frye standard" 8 insofar as disguised voices
were concerned" 9 and suggested that the technique failed to meet Frye
20
even without regard to the disguise problem.1
The Pendulum Swings Back
Despite the Chapter, Addison, and Law rejections, three appellate
courts subsequently admitted voiceprint evidence.' 2 , In United States v.
Franks,122 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit followed the view it
had earlier expressed that there is " 'a considerable area of discretion on the
part of the trial judge in admitting or refusing to admit' evidence based
on scientific processes.' 23 The court in a very superficial and highly unsatisfactory analysis managed to equate two of the three different tests
courts have applied in deciding whether to admit scientific evidence,'1 4 while
apparently basing its decision on the remaining test. In particular, the
court felt that criticism of a technique goes to the weight and not the
admissibility of evidence based thereon, and found no abuse of discretion
in admitting all relevant expert testimony, leaving evaluation thereof to
the jury.
In Commonwealth v. Lykus 125 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-

chusetts applied Frye to the voiceprint technique and held that the
technique does satisfy Frye. Tosi's work, as has been usual in the cases
where courts have admitted voiceprint identifications, was persuasive. The
majority accepted both his results and his projection of increased accuracy
through reliance on the professional examiner. 126 One judge dissented,
however, "simply on the proposition that the standard of Frye v. United
States ... has not been met.'

127

118. See note 98 supra.
119. See notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.
120. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 84, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
121. See also United States v. Sample, 398 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (voiceprints admitted at parole revocation hearing).
122. 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir. 1975).
123. Id. at 33, quoting in part United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 437 (6th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
124. [W]e deem general acceptance as being nearly synonymous with reliability.
If a scientific procedure is reliable or sufficiently accurate, courts may also deem
it "generally accepted."
511 F.2d at 33 n.12. But see note 141 and accompanying text infra.
125.

-

Mass. _, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975).

126. The Court did add the caveat that admission "should be subject to the closest
of judicial scrutiny, particularly in any case . . . where, but for the voiceprint, there
would be insufficient evidence to warrant any inference of the defendant's guilt." Id.
at

....

327 N.E.2d at 679.

127. Id. at _, 327 N.E.2d at 680.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also upheld
the admission of voiceprint evidence in United States v. Baler.2 8 The
court felt the issue in determining admissibility was "whether th [e] theory
has been sufficiently proved to allow the jury to give the evidence whatever
weight it sees fit.'

29

Although this framing of the issue resembles the

"reliable enough" approach of the Raymond court, the decision ultimately
turned on an expert testimony analysis similar to that of the Wright and
Franks courts. In particular the court felt that 30
[u]nless an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a
particular technique makes its use prejudicial or likely to mislead the
jury, it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same
manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked
by cross-examination and refutation.
The court went on to cite numerous precautions taken by the district
court and found that by these precautions that court had "adequately guarded
against the dangers inherent in the use of newly developed scientific
tests."''1 The court especially noted the judge's cautionary instructions to
the jury that they could disregard Nash's testimony if it appeared to them
unsound. The effectiveness of such instructions was not discussed; it
was presumed.
THE LEGAL PROBLEMS

The Addisdn court recognized the division over voiceprints existing
in the scientific community, 182 a division precluding any finding that there
is general scientific acceptance of the technique. The court therefore held
that the voiceprint technique did not meet the requirements of Frye and
that identifications based thereon should not be admitted into evidence.
But several questions, suggested throughout the foregoing discussion, remain: (1) is Frye the proper test? and (2) if so, when is it met?
The Proper Test
The cases discussed take three approaches to the problem of voiceprint
admissibility. One is the application of strict expert testimony theory.133
128. Crim. No. 74-1697 (4th Cir., July 9, 1975).
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id. at 8.
131. Id. at 9. The precautions included an extensive voir dire demonstrating the
probative value of the technique, the availability of rebuttal experts (but see note 145
infra), playing the tapes for the jury's own aural comparison, and giving cautionary
jury instructions (discussed in the text).
132. 498 F.2d at 745 n.10. See also Commonwealth v. Lykus, __ Mass. __ 327
N.E.2d 671, 679 (1975) (Kaplan, J., dissenting).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Baller, Crim. No. 74-1697 (4th Cir., July 9, 1975);
United States v. Franks, 511 F2d 25 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Wright, 17
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The distinguishing characteristic of this test is the role of the jury. The jury
evaluates the reliability of the technique in general and the correctness
of the application in the instant case. Under this approach the offering
party need lay only the foundation required for the admission of any
expert testimony: (1) that the subject matter is susceptible of expertise,
(2) that the experts who will testify are properly qualified, and, in the
case of a scientific procedure, (3) that the instant application was proper.
Where a procedure has received formal recognition of its reliability, either

by statute'3 4 or by judicial notice, 13 5 the testimony offered will go only
to the results of the instant application. Where the procedure is new or
controversial, however, the jury will hear expert testimony both as to
(1) the reliability of the technique and (2) the results of the instant application. The jury then evaluates the reliability of the technique in deciding
what weight to give the results of its application. 136 "[T]he scientific disagreement affects only the weight and not the admissibility of evidence.' 37
The other two approaches taken by the courts are subject to the
same basic foundation requirements insofar as they also require expert
testimony. They differ from the expert testimony approach in that after
the foundation is laid, the judge must apply some further test of admissibility before the jury is permitted to hear testimony. In one of these
approaches the judge seeks to satisfy himself that the technique is reliable
enough in his judgment to admit the results of its application into evidence.' 38 In the other he seeks to satisfy himself that the technique is
U.S.C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967). McCormick is a strong advocate of the
expert testimony approach. See generally C. MCCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 203 (2d
ed. 1972).
134. The use of radar to detect automobile speeds is an example of a procedure
with statutory approval in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud.
Proc. Art., § 10-301 (1974); United States v. Dreas, 156 F. Supp. 200 (D.Md. 1957).
135. Prior to the enactment of statutes governing its use, radar detection of automobile speeds went through a phase in which courts took judicial notice of its reliability. For a discussion of the gradual acceptance of this procedure, see Boyce,
Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH L. REV. 313,
315-17 (1964); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 210 (2d ed. 1972).
136. Qualified expert testimony may always be introduced to dispute the results
of the instant application of a technique. For example, if the state's voiceprint expert
makes an identification, the defendant may introduce a voiceprint expert (if he can
find one; see note 145 and accompanying text infra) to dispute that identification.
This avenue is available in addition to an attack on (1) the reliability of the technique and (2) the foundation for the instant application.
See People v. Chapter, 13 CRim. L. REP. 2479 (Manin County, Cal. Super.
Ct. July 23, 1973) for the rejection of a voiceprint identification due both to the
failure to meet the Frye test and the failure of the instant application foundation
(improprieties in preparation of voice exemplars and spectrograms).
137. State v. Olivas, 77 Ariz. 118, 119, 267 P.2d 893, 894 (1954) (discussing the
admissibility of a breath test for determining intoxication). See also United States
v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 (6th Cir. 1975).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972);
Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1972).
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reliable enough in the judgment of the relevant scientists to justify the

admission into evidence of results based on it. The usual formulation,
based on Frye v. United States, is that the technique must be generally
accepted in the scientific community. 130
The justification typically offered for applying either of the alternatives
to Frye is that Frye is unduly restrictive, retarding the admission of
scientific evidence based on new procedures since it may be some time
before they "attain sufficient currency and status to gain the general acceptance of the relevant scientific community." '14 0 The expert testimony
approach is much less restrictive, admitting all relevant expert testimony
once the proper foundation is laid. The approach in which the judge makes
some determination as to reliability in deciding whether to admit the
evidence is more restrictive than the expert testimony approach but is still
less restrctive than Frye. For example, if one half the scientific community
testified that a procedure was reliable and one half testified that it was not,
the judge could disbelieve the opponents and find the technique reliable; but
he could not find that it was generally accepted. 1 4 1
The problem with the alternatives to Frye is basically a mistaken
division of labor. Under the alternatives, a judge or jury makes the
essentially scientific decision on the question of reliability, yet neither
has any scientific expertise. Further, both are likely to be overly impressed
by the scientists' pedagogy. Frye, on the other hand, "assures that those
most qualified to assess the general validity of a scientific method will
have the determinative voice.' 42 That is, Frye assigns to relevant
scientists the judgment as to reliability, while reserving for judges the
task of determining whether enough of these scientists find the procedure
reliable. This approach is much more susceptible of judicial treatment
than those involving lay judgments as to reliability. Fairness to the
criminal defendant also seems to call for the application of the Frye test:
before the results of a scientific process can be used to convict a man, he is
139. See, e.g., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974); People
v. Chapter, 13 CRIM. L. REP. 2479 (Marin County, Cal. Super. Ct. July 23, 1973);
Hodo v. Superior Court, Riverside County, 30 Cal. App. 3d 780, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547
(Dist. Ct. App. 1973). But see note 124 supra.

140. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In United
States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Pa. 1974), Frye was expressly rejected as
precluding too much relevant evidence in the context of a parole revocation hearing.
Id. at 53. Whether Frye is unduly restrictive for other purposes the court did not say.
For criticism of Frye, see generally Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific
Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH L REv. 313 (1964); Kamine, The Voiceprint
Technique: Its Structure and Reliability, 6 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 213, 239 (1969) ; Strong,
Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1;
Note, Evolving Methods of Scientific Proof, 13 N.Y.L.F. 677, 686 (1967).
141. This analysis points out the flaw in the Franks court's equation of the "reliable
enough" and "general acceptance" tests. See note 124 supra.

142. 498 F.2d at 744.
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entitled to a scientific judgment on the reliability of that process. 14 Finally,
Frye should result in greater uniformity in decisions; it is quite unlikely
that judges and juries throughout the country will have the same view
about a particular technique's reliability; it is far more likely that different
judges can reach the same result on the question of general acceptance in
the scientific community.
Frye provides an additional advantage besides substituting scientific
for lay judgment as to scientific reliability. The Addison court pointed out
that Frye ensures the existence of a "minimal reserve of experts"' 44 who
can be called by a party to rebut the testimony of the offering party's
experts by attacking the instant application of the technique. By requiring
general acceptance by the relevant scientific community, Frye implicitly
requires that that community exist. The alternatives to Frye fail to take
into account the possibility that the expert before the court may be the
only expert in the field. Such a situation is intolerable; even if the technique
in general is perfectly reliable, the defendant should have the opportunity
to contest the instant application. If the only experts available are those
145
used by the prosecution, the defendant will be denied this opportunity.
The Addison court recognized these arguments in reaffirming Frye
as the "standard for determining whether a generic class of scientific
evidence is to be admitted at trial."' .46 The court also recognized the failure
of the voiceprint technique to meet the Frye "acceptance" requirement
since a significant segment of the scientific community is clearly hesitant
about the forensic use of voiceprint identification. 47 The holding that
143. "It is not for the law to experiment but for science to do so." State v. Cary,
99 N.J. Super. 323, 332, 239 A.2d 680, 684 (1972).
144. 498 F.2d at 744.

145. Voiceprints are a classic example of a technique without experts. Initially
only Kersta had worked with the technique, and even now few have actually experimented with it, a point which Tosi made in his response to Bolt et al., Supra note 30.
See Tosi, Reply, supra note 38.
The real problem is the lack of any "pool" of expert identifiers. Phoneticists
and related scientists have testified as to their views on the impropriety of relying on
voiceprint identifications, but no one has ever challenged an identification itself because
there is no one to so testify. See note 149 and accompanying text infra. An important
avenue for contesting voiceprint evidence is thereby foreclosed, forcing defendants to
challenge an identification by the more circuitous and less effective approach of challenging the technique itself. But even in this approach the prosecution has the advantage as its principal witness is likely to be Tosi, whose work and testimony in the
absence of contradiction have proven highly persuasive. See cases discussed in text
accompanying notes 80-106, 121-31 supra. The only challenge to Tosi available to a
defendant is the testimony of theoretically-skeptical scientists, whose testimony is, in
the opinion of some courts, far less persuasive than Tosi's, not because Tosi is right,

but because he is the sole possessor of empirical data.
On the constitutional implications of a lack of experts see note 170 infra.
146. 498 F.2d at 743.
147. See notes 56 and 132 and accompanying texts supra.
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the voiceprint technique has "not attained the general acceptance of the
scientific community to the degree required . . . by Frye" was clearly
correct on the record before the court. The trial court erred not by misinterpreting the record, but by applying the wrong test. 148
Although the court of appeals pointed out Frye's value in assuring
the existence of a "minimal reserve of experts," it failed to note voiceprinting's abysmal status in this regard :149 only one-half the relevant scientific
community exists, that which understands and deals with the theory of the
technique. There is no "minimal reserve" of identification experts; in fact,
there are no expert identifiers except for Nash and Kersta. 150 Whereas in
other areas of scientific evidence each side may seek out an expert to
contradict the other side's conclusion, in a voiceprint identification case,
that option does not exist. There is simply no one for the defense to
produce to dispute an identification,' 51 yet the scientific discussion earlier
in this note indicates that making an identification is not an elementary
58
task.152 In particular, Tosi's insistence on the examiner's five options
and Nash's record of non-identifications 5 4 suggest that were other identifiers available, a party would frequently be able to adduce expert testimony
that the instant identification was not at all clear. The lack of experts
may thus be a critical deprivation in the case of voiceprints.
148. See notes 91-92 and accompanying text supra.
149. See note 145 supra.
150. A survey of the cases fails to reveal any other identifiers. See also Tosi &
Nash, Voiceprint Identification: Rules for Evidence, TRIAL 44, 48 (Jan./Feb. 1973)
soliciting members for the International Association of Voice Identification, Inc.,
which at that time was over one year old and still had only its three charter members,
Tosi, Nash, and Kersta. Welch, Voiceprint Identification: A Reliable Index?, TRIAL
46 (Jan./Feb. 1973).
But see United States v. Baller, Crim. No. 74-1697 (4th Cir., July 9, 1975),
wherein the prosecution apparently furnished the defense "with the names of other

experts who could conduct their own analyses of the tapes," but the defense chose not
to call any of them. This may suggest the existence of other expert identifiers beside
Nash, but it is curious that except for Kersta's appearances in the early voiceprint
cases only Nash has ever made a courtroom identification.
151. See notes 145 and 149 and accompanying texts supra.
152. On the difficulty of making identifications it should be noted that in one of
Tosi's most recent statements he characterized the identification process as "highly
subjective." People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 69, 79, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708, 715 (1974).

This

statement is a particularly strong indication that challenging an identification itself
might frequently prove fruitful.
153. Tosi's five examiner options are: (a) positive identification, (b) positive
elimination, (c) possible identification, (d) possible elimination, and (e) no decision.
Tosi, Voice Identification,supra note 15, at 2042. See notes 36-38 and accompanying
text supra.
154. Nash failed to reach a conclusion in 396 cases out of 673 investigative voice
examinations from 1967-70. Tosi, Voice Identification, supra note 14, at 2042. See

also United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1971); People v. Law,
40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1974).
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Satisfying Frye

Given that Frye is the correct test, there remain several issues and
problems involved in its application. The most obvious question is how
much acceptance constitutes "general" acceptance, or in the alternative,
how much opposition precludes such a finding? No ready answer is available; this has engendered criticism of Frye and promotion of the expert
testimony rule.15 5 In view of the protections provided by Frye, however,
the difficulty of determining when the test is met is not good reason for
abandoning it. Rather the decision as to whether a technique has general
acceptance should be left to the judgment of the court, guided by some
general principle such as the substantiality of the opposing view points,
both numerically and qualitatively. This determination is no more difficult
than - in fact, it is an extension of - the general principles by which
relevant evidence may be excluded. The general rule is that the judge
may exclude relevant evidence where "its probative value is outweighed
by the risk that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of undue
prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading the jury .
"156 A

defendant is undoubtedly prejudiced by the admission of less than substantially reliable scientific evidence. Such evidence carries an aura of
infallibility 157 by which a jury is likely to be heavily influenced regardless
of its awareness of possible unreliability. Our society esteems science, and
the influence of this esteem on juries must be recognized. When making
a determination on the issue of general acceptance, the judge should balance
the relevance of the evidence against its prejudicial effect. The likelihood
that the jury will believe the test results and the incriminating value of
the evidence if believed are the key considerations for evaluating prejudicial
effect. The degree of general acceptance required should vary in direct
proportion to the amount of prejudice caused by admission. 158
Frye requires general acceptance by only that segment of the scientific
community that comprise "the particular field in which [the technique]
belongs.' u5 9 Courts must recognize the fields of expertise relevant to a
technique to ensure that only qualified experts are permitted to testify.
155. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 203 (2d ed. 1972).
156. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 303 (1942). UNIFORM RULES

rule 45 (1953) and

FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE,

OF EvIDENCE

Pub. L. No. 93-595, rule 403 (Jan. 2,

1975) are substantially the same.
157. See United States v. Baller, Crim. No. 74-1697 (4th Cir., July 9, 1975) at 7.
But see Welch, Voiceprint Identification: A Reliable Index?, TRIAL 45, 47 (Jan./Feb.
1973), reporting the acquittal of a defendant despite a voiceprint identification.
158. This analysis leads to the conclusion that limited admissibility may be a
worthwhile doctrine. For example, if the voiceprint evidence is merely corroborative
of other identification evidence the prejudicial effect of its admission will be diminished
and a more relaxed standard of general acceptance may be appropriate. Cf. State
ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971).
159. 293 F. at 1014.
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The courts must also be sensitive to the fact that the appropriate experts
may have to be drawn from several disciplines, each of which contributes
to the technique. In the case of voiceprinting, there is no obvious field
from which to draw experts. Rather, courts must seek testimony from
many fields, such as physics, linguistics, phonetics, physiology and anatomy. 160 Courts must also be wary of "apparent" experts as was the
court in King, which recognized the above fields as those most relevant
to voiceprinting and therefore excluded much of Kersta's testimony as that
of a mere technician. 81
After deciding which are the relevant fields, the court must see that
the appropriate experts testify. Where only proponents of a technique
appear, the court should sua sponte take the responsibility of inquiring
not just whether the experts believe the scientific community is generally
in agreement, but whether they are in fact aware of any opposing sentiment
in the relevant scientific community. The court should then make an effort
to ascertain the extent of any opposition so identified, calling its spokesmen as court-appointed experts if necessary. 162 This is the proper inquiry
under Frye: ascertaining the existence and extent of opposition to a
technique in the scientific community.
The most complex problem presented by Frye is the possibility - a reality in the case of voiceprinting - of general scientific acceptance of a given
degree of reliability. Certainly when reliability is so low as to render the
evidence non-probative and therefore not relevant, it will not be admitted.
But when a technique is reliable enough to be considered relevant, yet is
less than 100% reliable, should it be admitted? For example, it would
probably be correct to say that there is general scientific acceptance of
voiceprint identification to the extent of Tosi's actual results; that is, an
accuracy rate of 94% is possible in the right circumstances.1 63 But does
94% reliability justify admission? Where is the line to be drawn between
reliability sufficient for admission and that which is not? The distinction
between a flaw in theory and a flaw in application is significant here.'6
If the 6% error rate represents the fact that voices are not unique, 94%
accuracy may be insufficient to justify admission, at least under Wigmore's
160. Recall that the theory of voiceprinting was based on vocal anatomy and speech
formation. See notes 10-22 and accompanying text supra.
161. People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968). The court
recognized that Kersta was only an engineer and therefore not qualified to give opinions
on speech theory; his testimony was largely - and properly - excluded.
162. A court might also research the scientific literature. See, e.g., People v. Law,
40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1974); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
163. See People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1974) (testimony
of Dr. Ladefoged); United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972)
(testimony of Dr. Ladefoged) ; Bolt, Further Observations, supra note 43, at 533;
Jones, Danger - Voiceprints Ahead, 11 Am. CRIm. L. Rxv. 549, 566, 571 (1973).

164. See notes 57-64 and accompanying text supra.
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view of identification evidence. 165 This view is essentially a relevance
theory: if voices are not unique, an "identification" is meaningless.' 66 If the
error rate represents a correctable flaw, however - such as examiner
error - 947 may very well justify admission; few scientific procedures,
if any, can boast absolute freedom from errors in application.
Assuming relevance, the judge must weigh the probative value of the
the evidence - given its reliability - against its potential prejudicial
effect, excluding it if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.
In particular, the accuracy of the technique must be weighed against the
strength of the infallibility myth and the degree of incrimination a given
test result suggests. In the case of voiceprints, the infallibility myth is
unusually strong as a result of the technique's having been associated with
fingerprints. 167 Representations by voiceprint enthusiasts that its accuracy
and ease of application are comparable to those of fingerprinting and the
psychological suggestion that inheres in the name are responsible for this
misleading association. But the degree of incrimination suggested by a
voiceprint identification may easily exceed that of a fingerprint identification. A fingerprint identication is nearly always only circumstantial; it
merely associates the accused with a place or an object material to the
offense charged. Without more, however, it does not establish guilt. But a
voiceprint identification may establish guilt in and of itself. In a prosecution
for making obscene phone calls, for example, identification of the defendant's
voice as that of the caller would be conclusive on the issue of guilt if the
technique were 100% reliable. What does such evidence prove if the technique is only 94% reliable?168 If the voiceprint identification were the
state's only evidence, would the defendant be entitled to a directed acquittal? Or is there some degree of accuracy which enables conviction
on the basis of a voiceprint identification alone; that is, some degree of
accuracy at which identification proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ?169
165. See J.

WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE

§ 411 (2d ed. 1940). See also notes 59-60 and

accompanying text supra.
166. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra.
167. Kersta is largely to blame for this state of affairs. See

NATURE,

supra note 11.

168. Consider also the polygraph, whose proponents claim 99% accuracy, J. REID
& F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH ("LIE-DETECTOR") TECHNIQUE
234 (1966), yet whose results courts uniformly refuse to admit into evidence in
the absence of stipulation. See Note, Voiceprint Identification, 61 GEO. L.J. 703 (1973).
169. One circumstance in which voiceprints, and other less than fully reliable
techniques, might justifiably be used is a probable cause determination. Both the
prejudicial effect and the incriminating effect of the evidence would be de
jnimis
in such a situation. Furthermore, the evidence need only be sufficiently probative
"'to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that a felony has been committed" and that the defendant has committed it Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 479 (1963). Even if the flaw is in the theory, voiceprint identifications may
be probative enough for this use. Any use with a more serious effect on an accused,
however, ought to be withheld pending further experimentation.
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CONCLUSION

The voiceprint technique provides an ideal example of the problems
surrounding the admission into evidence of scientific evidence. These problems raise the questions of what values the law seeks most to protect
and what approach to admitting scientific evidence most protects those
values. It has been suggested herein that the two highest values are (1)
the right of an accused to a scientific rather than a lay judgment as to the
reliability of a scientific procedure whose results may convict him, and (2)
the right of an accused to have available a "minimal reserve" of experts
in order to have at least the opportunity to dispute the evidence against
him. 170 The "general acceptance" test of Frye v. United States seems best
to protect these values. Frye excuses the jury and judge from making the
scientific finding that a technique is in fact reliable; instead it requires the
judge to make the legal finding that enough of the scientific community
would rely on the technique to warrant a jury's reliance thereon.
The voiceprint technique clearly does not have the general acceptance
of the scientific community, nor is there a sufficient reserve of experts to
enable the party opposing an identification to challenge it. Furthermore,
the scientific community has expressed serious misgivings about its forensic
use even while accepting certain laboratory results. In particular, scientists
note the lack of experimentation on conscious deception - voice mimicry
and voice disguise - and uncontrollable change - physiological change and
time lapse. Certainly if scientists are hesitant about the use of a scientific
technique, so much so that they are willing to publish and testify to this
effect, the courts should be equally reticent.
A final failing of the voiceprint technique lies in its as-of-yet unexplained error rate. Even if all else were uncontroverted and there were
clear scientific acceptance of Tosi's results, admission might not be justified
because of the nature of voiceprint evidence. It is identification evidence
and as such depends for its probative value on the extent to which it points

170. The possibility of sixth amendment and due process objections should be
noted. The right to confront one's accusers ought to comprehend the right to do so
in a meaningful sense. Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-05 (1965); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). That meaningfulness is lacking where one stands
accused virtually by the work of one man. It is one thing for there to be no experts
on your side; it is quite another for there to be almost no experts at all, especially
since "[flew rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses
in his own defense." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). If "[tihe
right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair
opportunity to defend against the State's accusations," id. at 294, the admission of
scientific evidence against an accused may very well carry the constitutional prerequisite
of available experts. This does not mean there must be experts who will testify on
an accused's behalf, but only that the possibility exist. The mere right to crossexamination simply may not be enough where the evidence against an accused is of
a scientific nature. Witness the voiceprint cases.
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to only -one object. 171 If Tosi's error rate represents examiner error, or a
flaw in the manner in which the technique is currently applied, the errors
are truly errors, and may someday be corrected. But if Tosi's errors represent a flaw in the theory that every voice is consistently, detectably unique.
then the whole voiceprint concept fails from an evidentiary point of view.
That is, "incorrect" identifications may not be errors; two different persons
voiceprints may actually be the same. A match would therefore identify
no one and the use 'of voiceprint evidence should be limited on the most
17 2
basic of all evidentiary principles: relevance.
171. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra.
172. See notes 165-66 and accompanying text supra.

